Central and Eastern Europe’s Dependence on Russian Gas Imports: Playing the Source and Transit Diversification Game by Weiner, Csaba
        Centre for Economic and Regional Studies 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Institute of World Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Euro Zone Crisis, Member States’ 
Interests, Economic Dilemmas 
 
 
Proceedings of the 9th Hungarian-Romanian bilateral workshop  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Edited by 
 
Tamás Novák 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budapest, 
2013
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-963-301-599-5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Centre for Economic and Regional Studies 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Institute of World Economics 
H-1112 Budapest, Budaörsi út 45. 
vki@krtk.mta.hu 
www.vki.hu 
 3 
CONTENTS 
 
FOREWORD ....................................................................................................     5 
 
THE EUROZONE CRISIS AND THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
FACTORS FOR EU 
Simona Moagăr Poladian and Eugen Andreescu ..................................    7    
 
THE EUROZONE CRISIS FROM THE FRENCH POINT OF VIEW 
Miklós Somai ..........................................................................................   15 
 
GERMAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT – AN EXEMPLARY APPROACH AND ITS 
BACKGROUND 
Ágnes Orosz ............................................................................................   28 
 
CURRENT CRISIS AND CONVERGENCE PROCESS IN EU  
Lucian-Liviu Albu ...................................................................................   39 
 
IMPACTS OF EU ACCESSION ON THE HUNGARIAN AND 
ROMANIAN AGRICULTURES  
Judit Kiss ................................................................................................   51 
 
THE REFORM OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE EU  
Petre Prisecaru .........................................................................................   67 
 
INTERESTS OF THE DIFFERENT PLAYERS IN THE MFF DEBATE  
Miklós Somai ..........................................................................................   81 
 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE’S DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN 
GAS IMPORTS: PLAYING THE SOURCE AND TRANSIT 
DIVERSIFICATION GAME  
Csaba Weiner .........................................................................................   92 
 
 
 
Csaba Weiner 92 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE’S 
DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN GAS IMPORTS: 
PLAYING THE SOURCE AND TRANSIT 
DIVERSIFICATION GAME

 
Csaba Weiner
 
Central and East European countries express a strong fear of Russian gas, yet they 
have done little to reduce dependence. However, recently, some progress has been 
made in the diversification of supply and increasing the security of supply. It was 
not only the Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis in early 2009, but the period since 2008 
and 2009 has shown how different the conditions of each state are, i.e. to what ex-
tent they could have taken advantage of the benefits of changed conditions and 
globalising gas markets. For a Central and East European consumer, the focus is 
mainly on pricing, and the anti-trust probe that has been launched by the European 
Commission against Gazprom stresses the crucial importance of this issue. Despite 
many criticisms, the EU has made a few steps that can help reduce the fear and in-
fluence of Russia.
1
 
JEL Classification: D42; F14; L12; L71; L78; L95; L98; Q41; Q48 
 
                                                 
 A paper presented at the 9th Hungarian-Romanian bilateral workshop “Eurozone crisis, member 
states interests, economic dilemmas” held on 30 November, 2012 at IWE 1122 Budapest, Budaörsi 
út 45. 
 Csaba Weiner, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics, Research Centre for 
Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary. 
1 Based on information up to 30 November 2012 (i.e. up to the date of the roundtable). 
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1) Introduction 
It has been conventional wisdom to talk about Central and East European (CEE) 
dependence on Russian gas imports and the western Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS)2 as transit routes. But despite the common past, the CEE region is not 
totally homogeneous. The 13 gas importing countries3 of Central and Eastern 
Europe have different conditions. They are to a different extent dependent on gas, 
gas imports and Russian gas. A central question is the extent to which a country’s 
domestic gas production can meet its demand. Besides, other major elements need 
to be looked at: on how many pipelines and from how many directions a country 
can receive gas; which transit pipelines pass through it (if any); whether the country 
has a seashore to make use of terminals to regasify liquefied natural gas (LNG); and 
what the capacity of the particular country’s underground gas storage(s) is.4 
The Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2009 showed exactly the conditions 
of the Central and East European states and the achievements in improving the se-
curity of supply at that time. South-East Europe suffered very seriously, but in Cen-
tral Europe, Slovakia was also strongly affected by the gas crisis.  
Since 2005, several gas supply contracts have been signed or extended with 
Gazprom5 in the CEE region, but some contracts will expire already at the begin-
ning and in the middle of the 2010’s. Before the extension of these contracts, it is 
important to see how much Russian gas will be needed, and in order to enjoy a bet-
ter bargaining position, it would be necessary to show progress in diversification 
projects. 
2) Market changes, with special attention to the pricing 
In the last four to five years, the global gas market picture has changed signifi-
cantly, although these events have affected different regions differently, even within 
                                                 
2 Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. 
3 These are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Croatia did not extend its long-term 
gas supply contract with Russia when it expired at the end of 2010. Among the Central and East 
European countries, Albania and Montenegro (and Kosovo) do not import gas at all. They have no 
import capacity.  
4 The issue of underground gas storage facilities is not analysed here, while emphasising their impor-
tance. Among Gazprom’s customers in the region, there are no gas storage facilities in Estonia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, while in Serbia one has recently been 
opened. 
5 Gazprom or its 100 per cent owned subsidiaries have the exclusive right to export gas or LNG pro-
duced in Russia. In principle, this monopoly does not apply to production-sharing agreements (PSA), 
but Gazprom has successfully prevented the Sakhalin-1 PSA project to export gas directly to China. 
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Europe. Several factors have been shaping the process. Among the most important 
are: the onset and the effects of the economic crisis, the sharp rise in unconventional 
gas production (most importantly the shale gas revolution in the US), the surge in 
LNG production and globalising gas markets. 
The main challenge for gas is the way it is priced.6 Since the end of 2008, the so-
called “two-price” or “hybrid price” market has been seen in Europe.7 The role of 
the gas trading hubs and their prices started to grow. As a consequence of the over-
supply, the spot market gas prices have fallen well below oil product-indexed prices 
in long-term gas supply contracts. Moreover, after having recovered from a down-
ward spiral, oil prices have remained (relatively) high.  
Gas consumption fell in Europe not only in 2009, the year of the economic crisis, 
but in 2011 as well, and it is projected to fall again in 2012,8 despite the gas demand 
shock in early 2012. In 2011, three additional factors deserved serious attention: the 
temporary suspension of Libya’s gas exports, the Fukushima nuclear disaster and 
the subsequent decisions on nuclear power plants. At present, apart from the 
weather conditions, European gas demand is driven by the problems of economic 
growth, the (relatively) high gas prices, the strong growth of renewables and the 
extremely low CO2 prices.
9 “Because of coal’s replacement by gas in the US, more 
coal is being exported to the EU, because of weak [carbon reduction] targets and 
because the gas prices are very high here.”10 At its lowest level in 2012, gas in the 
US traded at around one-fifth of import prices in Europe and one-eighth of those in 
Japan.11 
Gas exports outside the former Soviet Union12 by Gazprom Export, a 100 per 
cent owned subsidiary of Gazprom, fell sharply in 2009 (from 158.8 bcm13 in 2008 
to 140.6 bcm in 2009), in which the lower gas demand, high contract prices and gas 
interruption during the Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2009 also played a 
role. 2010 brought a slight further decline before soaring in 2011 (from 138.6 bcm 
in 2010 to 150.0 bcm in 2011), still far below the 2008 level. High oil product-
linked contract prices of Gazprom have clearly been curbing gas demand. 
                                                 
6 Answer given by Jonathan Stern to the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei about the main challenge 
facing the gas industry over the next years (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJMWBr-R9Cg). 
7 Stern–Rogers (2011). 
8 Dow Jones Newswires, 1 October 2012. 
9 IEA (2012a, 2012d). 
10 Stephan Singer of WWF for Natural Gas Europe (28 November 2012 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/shale-gas-environmentalist-perspective). 
11 IEA (2012e): 2. 
12 This gas belongs to Gazprom’s gas balance (or produced/owned by Gazprom) and is sold under 
long-term gas supply contracts. In this paper, we do not analyse the causes of differences between 
data taken from the Russian customs statistics and various Gazprom sources. 
13 The abbreviations used for units of measurement in this study are: bcm – billion cubic metres; 
bcma – billion cubic metres per annum; mcm – thousand cubic metres. 
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In 2009, almost all 
customers of Gazprom 
Export outside the former 
Soviet Union bought less 
gas than in 2008. In 
2009, Poland was the 
only one, which, after the 
removal of the controver-
sial Russo–Ukrainian in-
termediary company Ro-
sukrenergo, increased its 
imports, and significantly 
so, while Switzerland 
took roughly the same 
amount as in 2008. In 
2010, Poland became the 
fourth largest customer of 
Gazprom Export outside 
the former Soviet Union, 
ahead of France, and it 
still retains that posi-
tion.14  
In 2011, 25.3 per cent 
of gas exports by Gaz-
prom Export outside the 
former Soviet Union 
went to ten Central and 
East European states. 
This volume (accounting 
for 38 bcm of gas) is 
more than 10 per cent 
below the 2008 level, but 
if Croatia is not counted 
in this, then it is almost 8 
per cent below the 2008 
volume. Besides Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia are among the 
large customers in the region. In 2011, apart from Poland and Macedonia, all coun-
tries bought less gas from Gazprom than in 2008. 
Gazprom wants prices that are independent of market conditions. But if it con-
tinues, Gazprom will have more and more problems with gas exports.15 Since 2010, 
Gazprom has granted various concessions regarding the long-term gas supply con-
tracts, but the best is yet to come. In 2011, 58 per cent of the gas sold in Europe was 
under an oil-linked formula, but due to renegotiations and arbitration cases, this ra-
                                                 
14 As to Gazprom Group’s total sales in Europe, Poland and France had already changed places in 
2009, but in 2009 and 2011, gas sales to the UK exceeded those achieved in Poland. 
15 Bloomberg, 14 March 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-14/gazprom-trips-in-india-
as-shale-upends-asia-gas-markets-energy.html. 
Table 1 
Prices for Russian gas in Europe 
($/mcm)* 
 
 2011a, 1) 2010a, 1) 2010b 2009b 
Macedonia 462 381   
Bosnia and Herzegovina 429 339   
Poland 420 331 336 333 
Czech Republic 419 326 ~3202) n.d. 
Greece 414 359 357 n.d. 
Italy 410 331 331 321 
Switzerland 400 296   
France  399 306 306 297 
Baltic States3) 397 333   
Bulgaria 391 311 310 n.d. 
Austria 387 305 304 259 
Hungary 383 350 348 306 
Turkey 381 326 328 290 
Romania 380 325 304 294 
Germany 379 270 271 294 
Slovenia 377 312   
Netherlands 366 308 302 312 
Finland 358 273 271 250 
Slovakia 333 371 ~3702) n.d. 
Great Britain 3314) 2404) 191 260 
* No data was given for Serbia. 1) Average prices, including 
European operations, i.e. there is no available price data for gas 
that comes exclusively from the territory of Russia. 2) Prelimi-
nary data. 3) An average for the three states (Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania). 4) There is no accurate price data for Great Britain, 
thus average spot prices at the British National Balancing Point 
(NBP) are given. 
Source: a Vedomosti, 18 June 2012. b INEI RAN (2011): 15–16. 
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tio has been falling.16 According to late 2011 and early 2012 information, Gazprom 
supplies only 7 per cent of its total gas exports to Europe at spot rates.17 Gazprom 
responded too late to the market processes, and has lost its market share in Europe. 
In 2011, the EU’s main external source of supply was Russia, representing 24 per 
cent of the EU’s gas consumption. Other major sources were Norway (19 per cent), 
Algeria (9 per cent) and Qatar (7 per cent).18 
In the CEE region, price disputes of RWE Transgas, the Czech subsidiary of 
Germany’s RWE and the Lithuanian Energy Ministry with the Gazprom Group are 
to be resolved via arbitration. PGNiG of Poland has recently secured a deal with 
Gazprom, closing the arbitration proceedings. In October 2012, RWE Transgas won 
an arbitration procedure for the fulfilment of the take or pay clauses, but Gazprom 
Export will certainly appeal. 
In early September 2012, one year after the end-September 2011 inspections at 
the premises of companies active in the supply, transmission and storage of gas in 
several EU Member States (mainly in Central and Eastern Europe), the European 
Commission launched an anti-trust probe against Gazprom. The Commission is in-
vestigating three suspected anti-competitive practices in Central and Eastern 
Europe, involving Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary and Bulgaria.19 First, Gazprom may have divided gas markets by hinder-
ing the free flow of gas across Member States. Second, Gazprom may have pre-
vented the diversification of gas supply. Finally and third, Gazprom may have im-
posed unfair prices on its customers by linking the price of gas to oil [product] 
prices. 
3) Gas demand and production in Central and Eastern 
Europe 
The Central and East European countries20 can be divided into three distinct groups 
based on the role of gas in primary energy consumption. In 2011, Hungary and 
Lithuania were the countries where gas had the biggest part in primary energy con-
                                                 
16 Natural Gas Europe, 13 September 2012. http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/shale-gas-needed-for-
fully-functioning-eu-gas-market. 
17 This data is derived from Gazprom’s 2011 November Base Prospectus and reiterated by Alexander 
Medvedev (of Gazprom) in Gazprom’s Investor Day in London on 14 February 2012. However, we 
understand that this figure has increased since that time (Gazprom Investor Day, Questions and an-
swers, London, 14 February 2012 http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/67/590264/2012-02-14-investor-
day-london-en.pdf). 
18 Eurogas – Press Release, 29 March 2012. 
http://www.eurogas.org/uploaded/Eurogas%20press%20release%20on%20More%20customers,%20
consuming%20less%20gas,%20in%202011.pdf. 
19 European Commission – Press Release (IP/12/937, 4 September 2012); Bloomberg (4 September 
2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-04/gazprom-faces-eu-antitrust-probe-on-eastern-
european-gas-sales.html). 
20 Without Montenegro and Albania, but with Croatia. 
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sumption, but the ratio was also high in Latvia, Romania, Croatia and Slovakia. In 
all six cases, representing the first group of countries, ratios were higher than the 
OECD average, and even the OECD Europe average. However, it was below the 
average in countries of the second group, comprising the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, 
Poland, Slovenia, Serbia and Estonia. Finally, in countries such as Macedonia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina gas played an extremely low role in the energy balance. 
Table 2 
Gas balances of the Central and East European countries in 2011* 
(bcm) 
 
 Estonia Latvia 
Lithua-
nia 
Poland Czech R. Slovakia Hungary Romania 
Production - - - 6.2(a) 0.2 0.1 2.8 11.0 
Gas demand 0.6 1.6 3.4 17.2 8.9 5.6 11.6 14.4 
Total imports 0.6 1.7 3.5 11.8 9.3 5.9 8.0 3.1 
   of which LNG - - - - - - - - 
Total exports - - - 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.6 - 
Total storage capacity - 2.3 - 1.7 2.5 2.7 4.2 3.1 
Share of gas in 
TPES(a) (%) 
10.1 33.1 36.0 12.6 17.2 28.1 38.2 30.8 
Self-sufficiency (%) - - - 36.0 2.2 1.8 24.1 76.4 
 
 Bulgaria Slovenia Croatia Bosnia-H. Serbia Macedonia 
Production 0.5 0.0 2.3 - 0.4 - 
Gas demand 3.3 0.9 3.2 0.2 2.4 0.1 
Total imports 2.8 0.9 0.9 0.2 2.0 0.1 
   of which LNG - - - - - - 
Total exports - - 0.2 - - - 
Total storage capacity 0.3 - 0.6 - 0.5 - 
Share of gas in 
TPES(b) (%) 
12.9 12.0 30.8 3.1 11.9 3.3 
Self-sufficiency (%) 15.2 0.0 71.9 - 16.7 - 
* Estimates. (a) Compare it with other data sources! For example, according to national sources, do-
mestic gas production was 4.3 bcm in 2011, similar to that of BP. (b) Total Primary Energy Supply. 
- Nil. 0.0 Negligible. 
Source: The table is based on the numbers of the IEA’s ‘Gas Trade Flow in Europe’. We assume that 
the IEA uses ‘0’ where the amount is negligible or nil. We corrected these numbers with data from 
IEA (2012a, 2012b, 2012c) and Gazprom. However, in some cases, data for correction were only 
available for 2010. 
 
 
In the CEE region, Poland, Romania and Hungary are the largest gas consumers, 
with a combined share of nearly 60 per cent in 2011.21 In 2009, in all countries un-
der review except for Albania (where it did not change), gas consumption de-
creased, quite dramatically in certain cases (in the order of 30 to 40 per cent). How-
                                                 
21 The data was taken from the IEA. 
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ever, in most countries, gas demand reached its peak years before 2008.22 A key 
question is to evaluate the extent of additional gas demand in the CEE region, but 
the forecasts are contradictory. The current fickle economic conditions and uncer-
tainties around energy policies are no help in planning, making predictions or deci-
sions. 
Table 3 
 Gas demand scenarios for the Central and East European region 
(per cent) 
 
 
OIES 
by Honoré 
(2010) 
IHS CERA1) 
cited by 
Roberts (2012) 
TYNDP 
(2011)2) 
Kantor – Booz & Co. 
(2012)3) 
2020/2008 2020/2008 2020/2008 
2020/2010 
Min Base Max 
Estonia 0.0  +8.4    
Latvia -2.5  -20.3     
Lithuania -26.3  -15.0     
Poland +26.7  +15.3 +22.7 +45.3 +51.8 
Czech R. +2.9  +54.3 +23.0 +38.2 +60.0 
Slovakia +6.7  +15.5 +16.5 +24.4 +33.5 
Hungary -1.4 -8.3 +23.4 +5.3 +26.0 +55.6 
Romania +12.9 +16.2 -20.0 +17.2 +25.2 +37.9 
Bulgaria -7.4 +21.9 -13.0 +41.5 +77.5 +110.9 
Croatia -14.3 +58.6 +33.5 +34.5 +86.9 +105.2 
Slovenia -34.0 +30.0 +68.2 +14.3 +35.2 +42.4 
Serbia & M. +2.0 +39.1 +75.5(b)     
Bosnia-H. -32.5 +100.0      
Macedonia +10.0 +8x +7x     
Albania 0.0 -(a)      
1) The information came from a private study conducted by IHS CERA. John Roberts of Platts told 
this author that he thought the information dated back to 2010. 2) Final customers. 3) The data for 
2010 is also an estimate. (a) 2008: 0.0 bcm; 2020: 0.2 bcm. (b) Without Montenegro and UNMIK. 
 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, only Romania has substantial gas production, but 
gas production in Poland, Croatia and Hungary also needs to be mentioned. Roma-
nia and Croatia have been largely self-sufficient in their natural gas supplies, with 
76.4 per cent and 71.9 per cent of gas consumed in 2011, respectively.23 
It is hoped that unconventional gas would bring competition to the Russian-
dominated markets and lower gas prices. But one cannot predict the future of un-
conventional gas in Central and Eastern Europe. However, Black Sea gas is that 
Romania and, as a follower, Bulgaria are focusing on in 2012. And it looks like the 
Polish shale gas euphoria is disappearing, thus opening up to the realties. In order to 
avoid letting shale gas be the victim of PR failures, there are very strict rules that 
should be adhered to from the very beginning. Without following these principles, 
in some countries they will not even reach the point of determining whether or not 
they contain economically recoverable resources. In January 2012, after seeing lots 
of protests throughout the country, the technology of hydraulic fracturing for shale 
                                                 
22 IEA (2008, 2011a, 2012a). 
23 According to IEA definitions. 
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gas exploration and extraction was banned and Chevron’s exploration permit was 
revoked in Bulgaria. In Romania, the coming of the new government meant the end 
of Romania’s pro-shale gas position. A moratorium is effectively in place, in spite 
of the fact that so far, no relevant legislation has been adopted to implement such 
measures.24 In the Czech Republic, a moratorium on shale gas exploration is ex-
pected to be put in place until (at least) mid-2014 as well. 
4) Transit through the western CIS states and Central 
and Eastern Europe 
The bulk of Russian gas exports to consumers outside the former Soviet Union tran-
sits through three western CIS states, namely through Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova. Finland is interconnected with Russia. A large part of Turkish exports is 
delivered via the Blue Stream pipeline in the Black Sea, and gas deliveries via the 
Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea started in 2011. The gas pipelines going 
through Ukraine heading towards Europe follow the route of Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Romania and Moldova. Gas travelling through Moldova flows to Roma-
nia and onwards. Belarus provides transit services in the direction of Lithuania, Po-
land and Ukraine. In 2011, 101 bcm of gas was transited to Europe through 
Ukraine, while 44 bcm through Belarus and nearly 20 bcm through Moldova. There 
is no free transit through Russia. Among the three western CIS transit states, Gaz-
prom owns the Belarusian section of the Yamal-Europe pipeline, carrying Russian 
gas to Poland and Germany (and onwards), and the trunk gas pipeline network of 
Belarus’ Beltransgaz. In Moldova, Gazprom holds half of shares in Moldovagaz, 
including transmission pipelines. In Ukraine, Gazprom has no such position.  
In the CEE region, the three main transit routes lead through Slovakia, Poland 
and Romania. Gas transit through Slovakia reached a peak of nearly 85 bcm in 
1999.25 The Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, commissioned in 1999, reduced the sig-
nificance of Slovakia, while Poland became an important transit country to Ger-
many. 
 
                                                 
24 Transindex (21 June 2012, http://itthon.transindex.ro/?hir=29748); Natural Gas Europe (16 Au-
gust 2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/shale-gas-exploitation-in-romania-postponed); 
Dąborowski–Groszkowski (2012). 
25
 IEA (2005): 140. 
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Figure 1 
Cross-border entry/exit points of Russian gas to Europe  
at the borders of the former Soviet Union 
 
 
Source: Based on a 2011 map of East European Gas Analysis. 
 
 
Ukraine’s neighbours will or can find themselves in a new role of providing 
transmission services to Ukraine. In November 2012, for the first time, gas deliver-
ies to Ukraine were managed from the west by reverse flow. RWE started to supply 
physical gas flows to Ukraine from/through Poland, while Ukraine reduced its pur-
chases from Russia below the take or pay minimum. The Ukrainians also ap-
proached Hungary to find out whether physical gas supply to Ukraine is possible. 
By now, there are both technical and legal possibilities to pump gas to Ukraine from 
Hungary.26 Naturally, the Ukrainian partner should buy gas somewhere. At the 
same time, Slovakia’s transmission system operator (TSO) Eustream was consider-
ing the construction of a new bi-directional interconnection between the gas trans-
mission systems of Slovakia and Ukraine, but, as it was announced in October 
2012, the Open Season had not identified sufficient binding market interest in new 
transmission capacity.27 
                                                 
26 According to information provided this author by János Zsuga, CEO of Hungary’s TSO. 
27 Eustream – News, 19 June 2012, 15 October 2012. 
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4.1. Bypass pipelines and their effects on transit 
The first line of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, with a capacity of 27.5 bcma, had 
become operational in November 2011, followed by the opening of the second line 
in October 2012. If it is up to Russia to decide, this will not be the last line in the 
Baltic Sea. The Nord Stream shareholders considered a preliminary feasibility study 
for the third and fourth lines, and their construction was recognised as economically 
expedient and technically possible. One of the lines may go to Great Britain.28 The 
capacity utilisation rate of the Nord Stream pipeline is expected to attain high lev-
els, but since November 2011, the first line has only moderately been loaded. 
The South Stream pipeline through the Black Sea will provide a transport capacity 
of 63 bcma consisting of four strings; each of them is to have a capacity of 15.75 
bcma. The earlier plans envisaged two branches, a northern one and a southern one, 
starting from Bulgaria, however, the southern branch (Greece and southern Italy) has 
been removed from the agenda. Gas will go through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and 
Slovenia to north-east Italy, and legs are planned to be built to the Bosnian Serb Re-
public and Croatia from Serbia. In the end, Austria will not be connected to the South 
Stream pipeline (at least in the next five years),29 but Macedonia and (perhaps) Mon-
tenegro could join the project. In compliance with Putin’s end-December 2011 “rec-
ommendation,” the construction of South Stream would be officially (!) launched at 
the end of 2012. South Stream has a very high price tag, and both Nord Stream and 
South Stream spur a huge wave of pipeline construction in Russia as well. 
Nord Stream and South Stream create large additional capacity. Gas transit 
through Belarus and Poland are not at stake. In fact, Gazprom would increase the 
transit through Belarus at the expense of Ukraine. However, the Slovakian transit 
route has already been negatively affected. Transit through the Czech Republic will 
be doubly affected by the Nord Stream pipeline. This is because when completed, 
the Gazelle pipeline will increase transit through the Czech Republic. Gazelle is the 
continuation of Germany’s OPAL gas pipeline through the Czech Republic. OPAL 
is connected to the Nord Stream pipeline. 
A range of criticisms have been made of the intergovernmental agreements on 
South Stream signed by various countries in early 2008, partly because the agree-
ments state that the Russian party has the right to use all the capacity in the pipeline. 
But such mistakes can and must be avoided by at least using the information ex-
change mechanism on intergovernmental agreements between Member States and 
third countries (see the Decision No 994/2012/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 25 October 2012).30 
                                                 
28 RIA Novosti, 8 October 2012. 
29 Népszabadság, 11 November 2012. http://nol.hu/archivum/20121110-gaz_van__penz_lesz. 
30 For antecedents, see the EU Regulation No 994/2010 of 20 October 2010, concerning measures to 
safeguard the security of gas supply and the Conclusions of the European Council of 4 February 
2011. 
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Gazprom is strongly opposed to the EU’s Third Energy Package, not just be-
cause of the capacity utilisation, but also because of the so-called unbundling. Un-
bundling is a serious source of conflict with Russia on existing assets with Russian 
ownership as well. In Poland, the owner of the Polish section of the Yamal-Europe 
gas pipeline (EuRoPol GAZ) handed over operation and the Polish state-owned 
company Gaz-System became the independent system operator (ISO) in 2010. Gaz-
prom has stakes in all three “national” gas companies (in Estonia’s Eesti Gaas, Lat-
via’s Latvijas Gāze and Lithuania’s Lietuvos Dujos) of the three Baltic Sates, re-
spectively, so, unbundling concerns these assets. In Lithuania, the Government set 
an October 2014 deadline for the unbundling. The dispute between Lithuania and 
Russia is very intense. In Estonia, the national company must sell its natural gas 
transportation network before the end of 2014, and the Government is required to 
approve the sale. Latvia also announced its intention to unbundle gas monopoly. 
The deadline is no later than 2017. 
5) CEE countries on the way to diversification 
The gas crisis in early 2009 and also the year 2010 showed how different conditions 
of each CEE state have. The two extremes were represented by Croatia and Poland. 
The most significant results were achieved by Croatia in reducing dependence on 
Russian gas. The CEE region has not yet seen anything like it. However, it is obvi-
ous that Croatia’s participation in the South Stream project (i.e. the decision to con-
struct a leg from South Stream to Croatia) means that Croatia will buy gas from 
Russia in the future again. Despite various projects, Gazprom Export has an in-
creased part in gas supplies in Poland thanks to the elimination of Rosukrenergo. 
Such intermediary companies offered a certain degree of diversification in Hungary 
and elsewhere for some time. Excluding Croatia, Slovenia is the least dependent on 
Russian gas supplies and it has the most diversified portfolio of gas importing con-
tracts. The position of the Czech Republic and Hungary is worse than that of Slove-
nia, but long-term contracts with western countries and spot markets for cheaper 
natural gas bring a certain degree of diversification to their portfolio. The January 
2009 gas crisis was needed to force Slovakia to start diversification and consider the 
security of supply measures, to have at least contracts with western suppliers and 
import capacity other than from Russia. With the exception of very small amounts 
of gas imports, Serbia purchases most of its natural gas from Russia. The rest comes 
from Hungary. Romania is also able to buy gas from and through Hungary using the 
Hungarian–Romanian interconnector completed in 2009. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bul-
garia, Macedonia and the Baltic States are solely dependent on Russia for their gas 
supplies. However, physical reverse flow is possible for Bulgaria, as in the case of 
Slovakia.  
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5.1. Diversification through interconnections and LNG regasifica-
tion projects 
The European Council of 4 February 2011 concluded that no EU Member State 
should remain isolated from the European gas networks after 2015 or see its energy 
security jeopardised by the lack of the appropriate connections. The European 
Commission’s November 2010 communication on energy infrastructure priorities 
identified the following as priority projects in the CEE region: the North-South Cor-
ridor in “Central Eastern and South-East Europe”, the Southern Corridor and the 
Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan in gas (BEMIP Gas). According to the 
EU Regulation No 994/2010 of 20 October 2010, concerning measures to safeguard 
the security of gas supply, the transmission system operators shall enable permanent 
bi-directional capacity on all cross-border interconnections between Member States 
at the latest by December 2013, with some exceptions. This regulation also includes 
the binding infrastructure standard ’N-1’.  
In contrast to the large projects, the importance of interconnections is (also) em-
phasised. Building gas interconnections has been a long-standing unresolved issue 
in Central and Eastern Europe, but recently some progress has been made. Hungary 
has taken significant steps in this area. However, the European Commission argues 
in its most recent Staff Working Document on investment projects in energy infra-
structure (dated 15 November 2012) that Hungary “needs to increase its cross-
border capacity” because “its current capacity is insufficient to ensure the integra-
tion of national markets on a regional level”.31 The case of the Slovak–Hungarian 
interconnector showed clearly what options are available when considering a pro-
ject that cannot be made on market terms. Looking at the region south of Hungary, 
very little has been done apart from the interconnections with Hungary. The Euro-
pean Commission, among others, points out that Bulgaria “needs to play a more 
proactive part in opening up the Southern Gas Corridor.”32 
Among the LNG regasification projects in the region, the Polish and Lithuanian 
projects are to be realised by 2014. The others are only in planning stages. In Croa-
tia, the Adria LNG project of an international consortium has stalled. Thus, the 
Croatian state-owned pipeline operator Plinacro is examining an alternative project, 
the so-called ‘migration concept.’ In Romania, the project of the Azerbaijan–
Georgia–Romania–Hungary interconnector would develop an LNG regasification 
plant. Bulgaria is focused on compressed natural gas (CNG), and not LNG. The in-
creasingly protracted issue of a regional LNG terminal in the Baltic States has also 
shown how difficult it is to get any regional cooperation.33 In Lithuania, the LNG 
project is helped by the gas quota through the LNG terminal. However, in Poland, 
the maximum share of gas imported from one country has already been set since 
2000.  
                                                 
31 European Commission (2012b). 
32 Ibid. 
33 We do not believe in these Black Sea plans. 
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5.2. Diversification through the Southern Corridor 
The Southern Corridor34 initiative includes routes going through and from Turkey 
and other routes that could pass the Black Sea (both pipelines as well as CNG and 
LNG options) and the Eastern Mediterranean to the EU. The Trans-Caspian Pipe-
line would also be a major project in the Southern Corridor to bring new sources of 
gas to Europe. South Stream is not part of the Southern Corridor initiative. 
Apart from the delays, the common characteristic of the projects is that all 
Southern Corridor projects, except for the Trans-Caspian Pipeline and projects 
through the Eastern Mediterranean, bid for Azeri gas, namely gas from the second 
stage of the Shah Deniz field development (Shah Deniz 2). 
Since the autumn of 2011, important changes have occurred in the Southern Cor-
ridor, but the outcome is still far away. The first crucial change was when in Sep-
tember 2011 BP came up with the concept of the so-called South East Europe Pipe-
line (SEEP), which would have started in western Turkey and would have run 
across Bulgaria and Romania to Hungary’s eastern frontier, representing about a 
third of Nabucco’s length. The second crucial change was when, in November 
2011, Azerbaijan and Turkey started work on the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline 
(TANAP) project from Turkey’s eastern border to its western border.35 
The Shah Deniz consortium conducts a three-round selection process among 
pipelines from the western border of Turkey. In the first round of the race, in Febru-
ary 2012, it chose the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) over ITGI36 as a possible route, 
should it decide on the south of Italy as the destination. In the second round of the 
race, in June 2012, the Nabucco West project, an already scaled-down version of 
Nabucco ‘classic,’ was selected, rejecting the South East Europe Pipeline as pipe-
line option to Central and South East Europe. The Shah Deniz consortium is ex-
pected to make a final decision between Nabucco West and the Trans Adriatic Pipe-
line by mid-2013. Before the submission of the proposal for Nabucco West to the 
Shah Deniz consortium, the Hungarian Prime Minister indicated on 23 April 2012 
that Hungary’s Mol, or precisely FGSZ, owned by Mol, was leaving the project. By 
this time, several negative messages had been received from not only Mol, but from 
the Hungarian government, RWE, Bulgaria, the EU or the US. RWE is also consid-
ering leaving the project. 
The South East Europe Pipeline and Nabucco West mean an adaptation to the re-
ality. Main problems with the ten-year old Nabucco ‘classic’ have not been solved, 
and even though progress has been made on some issues, new problems have 
arisen. The State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic, or SOCAR, holding a 
controlling stake in the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline, can be a guarantee for the 
                                                 
34 The Southern Corridor would be – after the Northern Corridor from Norway, the Eastern Corridor 
from Russia, the Mediterranean Corridor from Africa and besides LNG – the fourth big axis. It aims 
at the transmission of gas from the Caspian Basin, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Eastern 
Mediterranean Basin to the EU (European Commission, 2010, 2012a). 
35 The South Caucasus (Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum) Pipeline needs to be expanded. 
36 ITGI (Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy) comprises the already operating ITG (Interconnector 
Turkey–Greece) and the IGI (Interconnector Greece–Italy) project, the latter including IGI Onshore 
and IGI Poseidon. 
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Turkish project. Certain other members of the Shah Deniz consortium (BP, Statoil 
and Total) will also be shareholders of the pipeline. Certain Shah Deniz sharehold-
ers will get shares in the pipeline that is to be selected to deliver gas from the west-
ern border of Turkey as well.  
According to Jonathan Stern, the decision to court Caspian gas was first and 
foremost a political one.37 But buying gas is rather a market-driven decision. Euro-
pean utilities expect supplies from the Caspian to be priced to reflect conditions 
across the continent’s freely traded gas hub markets. It must be noted that diversifi-
cation alone does not inevitably lead to supply security. And Azerbaijan has not yet 
demonstrated that it is a reliable supplier.38 Moreover, the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipe-
line, if ever built, would make Azerbaijan an important gas transit state as well.39 
6) Conclusions 
Since 2008, Gazprom’s market position has changed totally, while Gazprom is 
locked into the European market. In such a difficult situation, it has launched gas 
production in the Yamal Peninsula and is about to start building the South Stream 
gas pipeline. Additionally, in this situation, Gazprom faces an EU anti-trust probe, 
of which the most important issue is how gas is priced. In order to avoid more arbi-
tration, Gazprom recognised the need to narrow the gap between oil product-linked 
contract prices and hub-based market prices. The series of concessions means that 
Gazprom is aware that the status quo cannot be maintained, but has not yet accepted 
the need to shift to hub-based pricing.40 
Central and East European countries can take very limited advantage of the bene-
fits of changed conditions and globalising gas markets. This is partly due to the lack 
of necessary import capacity, and partly due to the long-term contracts. However, 
some countries have really benefited from the ongoing developments. 
Forecasts for gas demand in the Central and East European region are vague and 
different. Internal gas production has been steadily declining, so in countries where 
domestic gas plays a significant role in gas consumption, the degree of self-
sufficiency has also been eroding. The future role of unconventional and Black Sea 
gas in gas balances of particular countries remains a conundrum, but we do not see 
any revolution in the making. In such circumstances, Central and East European 
countries should put a much greater emphasis on energy efficiency. 
                                                 
37 Rausch (2012). 
38 Ibid. 
39 On 12 September 2011, the European Commission was given a mandate to negotiate a legally 
binding treaty between the EU, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to build a Trans-Caspian Pipeline Sys-
tem. 
40 These are Jonathan Stern’s findings about pricing principles of Gazprom. Bloomberg (17 January 
2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-17/gazprom-price-retreat-offers-eon-hope-as-euro-
crisis-cuts-demand.html); Financial Times (16 February 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2e57f4c4-58ad-11e1-9f28-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1oivhTm7f). 
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Nord Stream and South Stream can increase the security of supply. In the CEE 
region, South Stream dramatically rearranges the existing transportation and transit 
directions, thus some former investments may turn out to be unnecessary. It is im-
portant to emphasise that the Third Energy Package cannot be avoided by tactics 
when it comes to implementing pipeline projects with either Russian or non-
Russian participation. For example, it refers to both South Stream and the Hungar-
ian–Slovakian interconnector. 
Demonstration of the possibility of diversification plays an important role in di-
versification steps, if only showing Russia that there are other options. Different 
countries have taken different steps to ensure the security of supply and diversifica-
tion since the early nineties and, in particular, the January 2009 crisis, but the best is 
yet to come. LNG and pipeline projects are moving forward very slowly and being 
delayed for long. Acting on a commercial basis, these can be accepted but greatly 
erode the credibility of those governments’ and companies’ commitments.  
To obtain the Azeri gas is a key. By the end of the decade, Shah Deniz 2 gas 
could reach Europe. Nevertheless, in the future one must remember that Turkey is 
not an easy case to negotiate. 
We are convinced that Russia remains the single largest gas supplier to Europe. 
The vision or the goal of energy independence, which has been communicated in 
certain CEE countries, is far off the reality, regardless of what is to be understood 
by such statements. 
 
     
References 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy (various years). 
Council of European Energy Regulators – National Reports. Available at: 
http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_ 
PUBLICATIONS. 
Dąborowski, T. – Groszkowski, J. (2012): Shale Gas in Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-
lic and Romania: Political Context – Legal Status – Outlook. Centre for East-
ern Studies. OSW Report, Warsaw, September. 
European Commission (2010): Energy Infrastructure Priorities for 2020 and be-
yond: A Blueprint for an Integrated European Energy Network. Brussels, 
European Commission, 17 November. 
European Commission (2012a): Connecting Europe: The Energy Infrastructure for 
Tomorrow: Energy. Brussels, European Commission. 
European Commission (2012b): Investment Projects in Energy Infrastructure. 
Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2012) 367, Brussels, 15 No-
vember. 
Gazprom/Gazprom Export. Available at: http://www.gazprom.ru/; http://www.gaz-
promexport.ru/. 
Central and Eastern Europe’s Dependence on Russian Gas Imports... 107 
GRIPs: Gas Regional Investment Plans.  http://www.gie.eu/memberarea/purtext_ 
entsog_GRIP.asp?wa=plus_GRIP&jaar=2012. 
Honoré, A. (2010): European Natural Gas Demand, Supply, and Pricing: Cycles, 
Seasons, and the Impact of LNG Price Arbitrage. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press for the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies (OIES). 
IEA (2005): Slovak Republic: Energy Policy Review 2005. Paris, IEA. 
IEA (2008, 2011a, 2012a): Natural Gas Information 2008, 2011, 2012. Paris, IEA. 
IEA (2011b): Medium-Term Oil and Gas Markets 2011. Paris, IEA. 
IEA (2012b): Energy Statistics of Non-OECD Countries 2012. Paris, IEA. 
IEA (2012c): Energy Statistics of OECD Countries 2012. Paris, IEA. 
IEA (2012d): Medium-Term Gas Market Report 2012. Paris, IEA. 
IEA (2012e): World Energy Outlook 2012: Executive Summary. Paris, IEA. 
INEI RAN 2011: Informatsionno-analiticheskii obzor osnovnikh sobitii na ener-
geticheskikh rinkakh. Fevral 2011. Moscow, INEI RAN, March.  
Kantor – Booz & Co. (Kantor Management Consultants SA and Booz & Company 
Ltd.) (2012): Market Analysis and Priorities for Future Development of the 
Gas Market and Infrastructure in Central-Eastern Europe under the North-
South Energy Interconnections Initiative (Lot 2). Fiche vigie no 263, DG 
ENER/Unit B1. Final Report submitted to Directorate-General for Energy, 
Unit B1: Security of supply and networks, European Commission, 19 January. 
Konoplyanik, A. A. (2012): Russian Gas at European Energy Market: Why Adapta-
tion is Inevitable. Energy Strategy Reviews, Vol. 1, No. 1, March: 42–56. 
Rausch, K. (2012): Pipelines on paper. Wingas GmbH. Available at: 
http://www.wingas.de/2268.html?&L=1. 
Roberts, J. (2012): Energy in Central Asia: Drivers and Consequences. Oslo, Nor-
wegian Institute of International Affairs, 22 February. (Presentation.) 
Stern, J. – Rogers, H. (2011): The Transition to Hub-Based Gas Pricing in Conti-
nental Europe. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 49, March. 
TYNDP (2011): Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2011–2020. Available at: 
www.entsog.eu/. 
 
